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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Our final speaker is Professor Eileen Kaufman of Touro Law
School. She has been recognized by New York State Court
Judges for her expertise as a Pattern Jury Instruction Committee
member and as a reporter for Volume II of the Pattern Jury
Instructions. Furthermore, I would like to point out to all of you
that the remarkable work she has done on defamation is admired
throughout the judicial system. Professor Kaufman has a great
deal of interest in the areas of both racial and gender employment
discrimination, and she is a very appropriate person to discuss
the cases that have come down this past Term dealing with those
issues. She will also, as a bonus, give us a discussion of a very
important punitive damages case that came down. 1 Professor
Kaufman.
Professor Eileen Kaufman:
The two important employment discrimination cases from last
Term are Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins2 and St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks.3 While Hazen is an age discrimination
case 4 and St. Mary's is a Title VII case, 5 they can be viewed as
1. See Martin A. Schwartz & Eileen Kaufman, Punitive Damages in
Section 1983 Cases - Recent Developments, 10 ToURo L. REv. 541 (1994).
Professor Kaufman spoke briefly about recent Supreme Court developments in
punitive damages at this symposium. However, Touro Law Review
simultaneously published an article which she co-authored discussing the same
issue. Therefore, her discussion of punitive damages at the symposium has
been omitted.
2. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
3. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
4. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1704 (holding that an employee who claimed he
was fired because of his age to prevent his pension from vesting was not
enough to violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)).
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companion cases which serve to explain what an employment
discrimination plaintiff must now establish when attempting to
prove disparate treatment by indirect evidence. By way of
preview, suffice it to say that plaintiff's task has been made more
difficult as a result of these decisions.
It would be useful to preface my discussion of these two cases
with a very short explanation of how this variety of disparate
treatment claim differs from other varieties of claims for proving
employment discrimination. In every employment discrimination
case, and I think last Term's decisions serve to reinforce this, the
primary focus is whether the employer has treated the employee
less favorably than others for a statutorily defined impermissible
reason. 6 This can generally be established pursuant to two very
different theories of employment discrimination: disparate
treatment or disparate impact. The evidentiary methodology for
5. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746 (plaintiff claiming that his rights were
violated under Title VII because he was fired due to his race). Title VII, 42
U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1981), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
6. See Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1705 ("'Disparate treatment' ... is the most
easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion [or
other protected characteristics]." (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977))); International Union, United
Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) ("Respondent has chosen to treat all
its female employees as potentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination
on the basis of sex."); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978) ("The central focus of the injury in a[n] [employment discrimination]
case such as this is always whether the employer is treating 'some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.'" (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n. 15 (1977))); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 497-
98 (1971) ("Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [Title VII] requires
that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex.").
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proving discrimination differs markedly depending upon which of
those two theories of discrimination is utilized.
In a disparate treatment claim, the employer allegedly is
treating an employee less favorably because of the employee's
membership in a protected group. 7 These claims require the
plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination by the employer. 8
That can be done either by direct evidence or, as is far more
commonly done, by indirect or circumstantial evidence. 9
The evidentiary framework for making out a prima facie case
for disparate treatment depends upon whether it is a direct
evidence case or an indirect evidence case. The direct evidence
case is very straightforward. 10 Where the plaintiff has direct
evidence of a discriminatory policy or discriminatory treatment,
the burden shifts to the employer to justify its practice or
policy. 11 The employer must justify its practice or policy by
proving the basis for the exclusion is a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). 12
7. See Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1706. ("In a disparate treatment case,
liability depends on whether the protected trait... actually motivated the
employers decision.").
8. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988)
("[W]e have consistently used conventional disparate treatment theory, in
which proof of intent to discriminate is required ..... ).
9. See Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1710 ("Once a 'willful' violation has been
shown, the employee need not additionally... provide direct evidence of the
employer's motivation."); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) (plaintiff need not "submit direct
evidence of discriminatory intent"); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Proof
of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.").
10. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Carolina Freight
Carriers Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21454, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 1,
1992) ("The most straightforward way for a plaintiff to establish discrimination
is by direct evidence that the employer acted with discriminatory motive.").
11. See Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303, 1306 (6th Cir.
1990) ("An employer seeking to justify overt discrimination bears the burden
of establishing the BFOQ defense.").
12. See Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 645 (8th Cir.
1987) (agreeing with plaintiff's argument that "she submitted direct evidence
of discrimination under Title VII and that the defendant failed to establish that
such discrimination was justified as a bona fide occupational qualification
1994]
TOURO LAW REVIEW
In disparate treatment cases based on indirect or circumstantial
evidence, the nature and the order of proof are quite different.
The formula for allocating the burdens and order of presentation
of proof is based on the now familiar McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green formula. 13 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case by proving four elements:
(i) that [plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that [plaintiff]
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite [plaintiff's] qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of [plaintiff's] qualifications. 14
Once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, tie defendant must
show evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection."15 The employer's burden here is the
burden of production. 16 The burden of persuasion remains at all
times with the plaintiff in a disparate treatment case. 17 Once the
defendant articulates a non-discriminatory reason for the
employment decision, the plaintiff then has the burden of
demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
(BFOQ)"); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F. 2d 670, 674 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("The BFOQ defense is applicable to employment practices that
purposefully discriminate on the basis of sex .... .").
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding that an employer must have legitimate
and nondiscriminatory reasons for action against an employee).
14. Id. at 802.
15. Id.
16. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986
F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[o]nce the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection'").
17. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981). The Court stated that "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id.
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legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true
reasons, but rather a pretext for discrimination. 18
At least until last Term, the McDonnell Douglas formula had
proved very useful in cases where plaintiff lacked direct evidence
of an improper motive. 19 Under the formula, by proving those
four objective facts, plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption of
unlawful discrimination thereby requiring the employer to explain
itself.
A completely different way of proving employment
discrimination is to rely on disparate impact theory. In sharp
contrast to disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff in a disparate
impact case is not required to prove discriminatory intent.20
Rather, the claim is based on a facially neutral employment
policy which adversely and disproportionately affects members of
a protected group and which "cannot be justified by a business
necessity." 2 1 A few years ago at this conference we discussed the
evidentiary framework for analyzing a disparate impact case22
and it is really not necessary for our current purposes to describe
that framework in any detail.
With that backdrop in mind let us turn to last Term's cases,
both of which involved disparate treatment by either indirect
evidence or circumstantial evidence. Hazen is an age
18. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05 ("[Oin the retrial respondent
must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence
that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for
a racially discriminatory decision.").
19. See Johnson v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund, 978 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.
1992) (stating that "[t]he sequence of proof and burden shifting articulated in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green applies"); Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery
Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1528 (1lth Cir. 1992) (stating that "McDonnell
Douglas remains the model for disparate treatment cases .... "); Oxman v.
WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1988) (using the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting test for claims under the ADEA and Title VII).
20. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Proof of discriminatory
motive... is not required under a disparate-impact theory.").
21. Id. at 335 n. 15.
22. See Symposium: The Supreme Court and Local Government Lnv, The
1988-89 Term, 6 TouRO L. REv. 1 (1989-90).
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discrimination case. 23 This case was brought by Walter Biggins
who was fired at age 62 after working for Hazen Paper Company
for just less than ten years.24 The pension plan of the paper
company vested pensions at the tenth year anniversary of
employment. 25 Biggins claimed that his firing violated the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)26
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).27 He
believed that he was fired to prevent his pension from vesting and
that his age was inextricably linked with that decision. 28 The
company's explanation for the firing was that it considered
Biggins to be a disloyal employee because he began doing
business with competitors of Hazen.29 According to the
employer, this presented a risk that confidential information
would be disclosed to competitors of Hazen. 30 The jury rejected
Hazen's explanation and concluded that the company had violated
both ERISA and the ADEA, and further concluded that the
ADEA violation was willful which under the ADEA results in
liquidated damages.31
The Supreme Court's decision in Hazen addressed two
important ADEA questions: the standard for finding willfulness
under the ADEA32 and the standard for establishing underlying
liability in a disparate treatment case under the ADEA.33 With
23. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1704; see also supra note 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 29 U.S.C. §1001(a) (1985).
27. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)
(1990). The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age ....
Id.
28. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1704.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1708-10.
33. Id. at 1705-08.
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respect to evaluating willfulness under the ADEA, the Court
applied the standard that it had adopted in 1985 in Trans World
Airlines v. Thurston.34 It stated that a violation is willful within
the meaning of the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA if
"the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the
matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the [ADEA]." 35
The Hazen holding clears up some confusion among the
circuits and establishes that the Thurston definition applies
whether the case involves a facially discriminatory policy as in
Thurston, or an ad hoc adverse employment decision. 36
Essentially, the holding in Hazen tells us that the Thurston
definition of willfulness applies in all disparate treatment cases,
whether based on direct evidence or indirect evidence. 37
The potentially more important issue addressed in Hazen is
whether an employer violates the ADEA when the employer's
decision is based on a factor other than age, such as pension
status or seniority, a factor that is empirically correlated with
age. 38 The Court concluded that an employer does not violate the
ADEA when it acts on an age-correlated factor alone.39 Without
proof that age played a role and had a determinative influence on
the outcome, there has been no violation of the ADEA. 40
Applied to Hazen, the mere fact that the employer terminated
Biggins to prevent his pension from vesting, a factor empirically
34. Id. at 1708-09; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 128-30 (1985). The Court held that TWA's facially discriminatory
job-transfer policy was not a "willful" ADEA violation as TWA neither "knew
[nor] showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the ADEA." Id.
35. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1710 (citing Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128. "[The
Court of Appeals stated that a violation is 'willful' if 'the employer either
knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the ADEA. [W]e hold that this is an acceptable way to articulate
a definition of 'willful.'" (citations omitted) Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128.
36. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1708-10.
37. Id. at 1710.
38. Id. at 1705.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1706.
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correlated with his age, did not suffice to establish liability under
the ADEA. 4 1
While the Court made clear that reliance on an age-correlated
factor does not suffice to establish a disparate treatment claim
under the ADEA, the fact pattern in Hazen would seem to be the
classic disparate impact case. The claim would be that the
employer's practice of interfering with pension rights had a
disproportionate effect on older workers and cannot be justified
as a business necessity and thus violates the ADEA. However,
the Court declined to decide that issue because the plaintiff,
inexplicably, never raised or relied upon a disparate impact
theory. 42 However, Justices Kennedy and Thomas, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist in a concurring opinion, indicated a reluctance
to apply a disparate impact theory to age discrimination cases. 4 3
To date, at least six circuits, including the Second Circuit, have
concluded that disparate impact claims are encompassed within
the ADEA.44
41. Id. at 1707.
42. Id. at 1706.
43. Id. at 1710 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44. See Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992)
("The disparate impact doctrine, developed under Title VII, is also applicable
to cases under the ADEA."); Shutt v. Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 934 F.2d
186, 188 (9th Cir. 1991) (The plaintiff sued under the ADEA and the "case
was decided as a 'disparate impact' case .... ."); Wooden v. Bd. of Educ. of
Jefferson County, 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991) (Under the ADEA,
"[d]isparate impact results from facially neutral employment practices which
fall more harshly on one particular group and cannot be justified by business
necessity."), reh'g denied, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 13677 (6th Cir. June 10,
1991); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 771 (1 lth Cir.
1991) ("Under disparate impact theory [under the ADEA], discrimination can
be established by proving that a facially neutral employment practice, which is
unjustified by a legitimate business goal of the employer, has a
disproportionately adverse impact on the members of a protected group.");
MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Title
VII and ADEA liability can be found where facially neutral employment
practices have a discriminatory effect or 'disparate impact' on protected
groups, without proof that the employer adopted these practices with a
discriminatory motive."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Leftwich v.
Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) ("To establish
a prima facie case of age discrimination under a disparate impact theory, a
532 [Vol I0
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One other question left unresolved by Hazen is whether age-
motivation can be inferred from the fact that the employer had
articulated a false or pretextual reason for its decision to
discharge the plaintiff. Remember, the company had argued that
it had fired Biggins for doing business with competitors when
that was really not its reason.45 Does the fact that the company
lied when offering that reason necessarily mean that the plaintiff
has made out a case of unlawful discrimination? While that issue
was not resolved in Hazen, that was precisely the issue that was
resolved in the second employment discrimination case of the
Term, St. Mary's.
St. Mary's is a Title VII46 case where a black employee alleged
that he was demoted and fired from his supervisory position at
St. Mary's, a halfway house, due to his race. 47 Using the
McDonnell Douglas formula, 48  plaintiff had no trouble
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 49 He was
a member of a protected group because he was black. 50 He was
qualified for the position of shift commander. 51 He was demoted
from that position and ultimately discharged, 52 and the position
remained open and was ultimately filled by someone else.53
Having established the four elements of the prima facie case, a
rebuttable presumption then arises which requires the defendant
to come forward with a non-discriminatory explanation. 54 The
burden on the defendant is to produce evidence that the
plaintiff.., need only demonstrate that a facially neutral employment practice
actually operates to exclude from a job a disproportionate number of persons
protected by the ADEA.").
45. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1704.
46. See supra note 5.
47. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746 (1993).
48. See supra note 13-18 and accompanying text.
49. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
1994] 533
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employment decision was based on a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason.55
In St. Mary's, the defendant in district court did articulate a
non-discriminatory reason for demoting and discharging Hicks.56
The employer stated that Mr. Hicks was demoted and fired
because of certain institutional rule infractions. 57 However, the
district court found these reasons were not the real reasons for
plaintiff's demotion and firing because in large part other persons
had very similar rule infractions and no action had been taken
with respect to those individuals. 58 Additionally, there were far
more serious rule violations committed by Hicks' coworkers that
had been routinely ignored.59 Nevertheless, the district court
found that Mr. Hicks had failed to prove that defendant's actions
were motivated by race because "although plaintiff has proven
the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven
that the crusade was racially rather than personally motivated. "60
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court, finding
that once defendant's reason is shown to be false, the case should
be treated as one where the defendant failed to put forth a
legitimate reason, thus entitling plaintiff to a directed verdict as a
matter of law. 61 The Circuit Court explained that "[i]n other
words, defendants were in no better position than if they had
55. Id.
56. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (E.D. Mo.
1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742, on
remand to, 2 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 1250 ("The excessive accumulation of violations over a short
period of time is a legitimate reason for increasing the severity of discipline
with each violation committed.").
58. Id. at 1250-51 ("Plaintiff has carried his burden in proving that the
reasons given for his demotion and termination were pretextual.").
59. Id. at 1251 ("Although plaintiff committed several violations of
institutional rules, plaintiff was treated much more harshly than his coworkers
who committed equally severe or more severe violations.").
60. Id. at 1252.
61. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992)
("Once plaintiff proved all of defendants' proffered reasons for the adverse
employment actions to be pretextual, plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), on remand to, 2 F.3d 265
(8th Cir. 1993).
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remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established inference
that they had unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff on the
basis of his race." 62
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the fact finder's
disbelief of the reason offered by the employer does not compel a
finding of discrimination. 63 Even where the plaintiff has
demonstrated that the defendant's explanation was a mere pretext,
the plaintiff must nevertheless prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that discrimination was the real reason.64 In other
words, it is no longer sufficient to prove that the reason was
pretextual, rather plaintiff satisfies her burden only by showing
that the reason was a pretext for discrimination. 65
Justice Souter wrote a very sharply worded dissent and was
joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. 66 The dissent
attacked the majority for upsetting what Souter described as "two
decades of stable law" and for substituting an "unfair and
unworkable" scheme of proof which, in effect, rewards
employers who are prepared to lie in court. 67
I tend to agree with the dissent's appraisal of the practical
effect of this decision. Employment discrimination claimants who
cannot prove their case by direct evidence are bound to have a
much more difficult time as a result of this decision.
Additionally, it seems to me that the decision undercuts the very
reason why McDonnell Douglas was originally decided the way it
was. The McDonnell Douglas formula was adopted in recognition
62. Id.
63. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751 (1993)
("[Nothing in law would permit us to substitute for the required finding that
the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much
different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action
was not believable.").
64. Id. at 2751-52 ("[Tuhe plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were... a pretext for discrimination.").
65. Id. at 2752, 2755-56.
66. Id. at 2756-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2757, 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1994] 535
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that discrimination today is far more subtle than it used to be. 68 It
recognized that plaintiffs will typically not be able to point to any
smoking gun. 69 It is the unusual case where a plaintiff can
produce a direct eyewitness account that evidences the
employer's discriminatory motivation. The McDonnell Douglas
alternative framework was designed to "sharpen the inquiry into
the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination" 70 by
allowing the plaintiff to prove four facts that would then shift the
focus to the reason offered by the employer. 7 1 If a pretextual
explanation does not warrant a directed verdict for the plaintiff, it
is hard to see how the McDonnell Douglas presumption assists
the employment discrimination plaintiff even when the employer
produces a dishonest explanation. The plaintiff is then left to
produce evidence of discrimination that the plaintiff, by definition
in these cases, lacks.
Consider the current position of the plaintiff, Melvin Hicks, in
the St. Mary's case. In a decision rendered after the Supreme
Court's remand, the Eighth Circuit on August 16, 1993,
remanded the case to the district court to apply the Supreme
Court's newly clarified analytical scheme. 72 More specifically,
68. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and The Tortured Trilogy:
The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34
B.C. L. REv. 203, 214 (1993) ("As defendants become increasingly
sophisticated about the law .... admissions occur very rarely. Plaintiffs
therefore normally use [the McDonnell Douglas] circumstantial evidence [test]
to prove their Title VII and ADEA cases.").
69. See id. at 217. The author stated:
The Supreme Court recognized the inherent difficulty of proving
discriminatory intent when it adopted the presumption created by
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. Plaintiffs in disparate treatment
cases must prove that defendants acted with discriminatory intent, an
'elusive factual question' that is difficult to prove absent a 'smoking
gun.' The presumption raised by the prima facie case therefore gives the
plaintiff the opportunity to flesh out the facts. Most plaintiffs will not
have access to evidence of motive or intent, should any exist.
Id.
70. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8
(1981).
71. See supra note 13-18 and accompanying text.
72. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 2 F.3d 264, 266-67 (8th Cir. 1993).
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the Circuit Court directed the trial court to "hold an evidentiary
hearing in order to permit the parties to present additional
evidence on the now-critical question of [whether the defendants
were motivated by] personal animosity." 73 But, notice what has
happened here. In the first go around, plaintiff was able to show
that the reason offered by the employer was false.74 However,
the Supreme Court concluded that a finding by the Court that the
defendant's testimony is false is insufficient to establish racial
discrimination. 75 So now the plaintiff has to respond to, and I
suppose disprove, a reason never offered by the employer but
suggested by the Court. If the plaintiff is able to disprove this
reason, if the plaintiff comes to court and at this new evidentiary
hearing convinces the fact finder that the employer's decision was
not motivated by personal animosities, will that be enough or will
the cycle go on and on? Will the plaintiff have to rule out any
conceivable reason that either the employer or the court could
suggest? This begins to sound very similar to Professor
Friedman's talk earlier today concerning equal protection. 76
Plaintiff must try to think of any possible reason that the
employer could have had for the discharge and then disprove
each one. That may sound like an extreme vision of how St.
Mary's might play out, but one that I think is not all that terribly
far-fetched.
I should hasten to add that my doom and gloom prediction was
not born out in the Hazen remand. Just two weeks ago, the First
Circuit rendered an opinion in Hazen after remand from the
73. Id. at 267.
74. St. Mary's, 756 F. Supp. at 1252 ("[P]Iaintiff has succeeded in
proving that the violations for which he was disciplined were pretextual
reasons for his demotion and discharge. Plaintiff has not, however, proven by
direct evidence or inference that his unfair treatment was motivated by race.").
75. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2756 ("That the employer's proffered reason
is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish
that the plaintiff's proffered reason of race is correct. That remains a question
for the factfinder to answer. .. ").
76. See Leon Friedman, Retroactivity, Equal Protection and Standing, 10
TouRo L. REV. 503 (1994).
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Supreme Court. 77 The First Circuit applied the approach in St.
Mary's which clearly applies to ADEA cases as well as Title VII
cases, and imposed liability again. 78 The First Circuit relied on
the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of
the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief
is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with
the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination." 79 On remand, the First Circuit concluded that
plaintiff had introduced some indirect evidence: that the plaintiff
was required to sign a confidentiality agreement that no one else
was required to sign. 80 That finding, coupled with the finding of
pretext, sufficed to establish unlawful discrimination. 81
Ultimately, it is too soon to know how this will play out in the
lower courts. A recent Northern District of New York decision,
Anderson v. S. U.N. Y. Health Science Center,82 ducked what the
court considered the intricacies of interpreting the "slightly
altered" standard of St. Mary's by finding that even under the old
standard, plaintiff had failed to make out a prime facie case. 83 In
an Eastern District of Pennsylvania decision, Reiff v.
Philadelphia County Court,84 we learn that "a plaintiff who
offers reasonably sufficient evidence of pretext along with the
elements of a prima facie case will survive a summary judgment
77. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 1993 WL 406515 (1st Cir. Oct. 18,
1993).
78. Id. at *5. The court upheld liability under the ADEA, ERISA,
wrongful discharge, and fraud, and reversed the finding of liability under
breach of employment contract. Id.
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *1. The person who replaced the plaintiff was given an
agreement to sign, however it was substantially less onerous than the one the
plaintiff was required to sign. Id.
81. Id. at *4.
82. 826 F. Supp. 625 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) The court held that a black former
assistant affirmative action coordinator at S.U.N.Y. alleging race, gender and
retaliatory discharge failed to meet the burden of proving any of the three. Id.
at 631, 635.
83. Id. at 630-31.
84. 827 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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motion." 85 I think that is an important ruling. But there is also a
recent Fifth Circuit case, Odom v. Frank,86 which applied the St.
Mary's approach and concluded that although the defendant's
actions could not pass the "smell test," 87 the plaintiff had failed
to demonstrate that defendant's reasons were a pretextual smoke
screen for masking racial or age-based discrimination. 88
As a result of last Term's decisions, the key to litigating
disparate treatment cases is to recognize that it is no longer
enough to prove pretext. The emphasis from the plaintiff's point
of view must be to demonstrate that the reason was not just a
pretext, but rather a pretext for discrimination. In the absence of
direct evidence, it is not all that clear how plaintiff is to do that.
The best that can be said is that the plaintiff should, in every
possible way, try to raise doubts about the employer's actions in
an effort to convince the trier of fact that given the employer's
dishonesty, the employer was actually motivated by a
discriminatory animus.
Let me end with a curious footnote that may be of interest to
some of you. St. Mary's was just applied in a New York case in
a totally different factual context, not a discrimination case at all,
but a peremptory challenge Batson89 case. In People v.
Howard,90 the Nassau County Court talked about the St. Mary's
approach in figuring out motivation and applied it to conclude
85. Id. at 324-25.
86. 3 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 1993).
87. Id. at 850. The "smell test" is credited to the late Irwin Younger. He
stated:
[Tihe most important item in the courtroom and all too seldom used is
the judge's nose. Any trial judge will inevitably come to the conclusion
on occasion that a certain case or claim or defense has a bad odor.
Simply put, a matter smells. Some smell so bad they stink.
Morgan Fiduciary, Ltd. v. Citizens & S. Int'l Bank, 95 B.R. 232, 234 (S.D.
Fla. 1988).
88. Odom, 3 F.3d at 850.
89. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Court held
that under the Equal Protection Clause a prosecutor may not use a peremptory
challenge against a potential juror if the challenge is based on a racial motive.
Id. at 89.
90. 158 Misc. 2d 739, 601 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1993).
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that a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. 91 It is an interesting application of
St. Mary's.
Thank you very much.
91. Id. at 747, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 553 ("It is clear to this Court that the two
exercised peremptory challenges would have been and were properly
interposed for racially neutral reasons, notwithstanding a de minimus allusion
to race.").
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